SUMMARY The text that follows is a statement of opinion on the use and meaning of recurrence rates in genetic counselling. It will have served its purpose well if it becomes the starting point of fruitful discussion among counsellors, and if its major points are formally tested.
Historically, the first task of medical geneticists has been to calculate and establish 'recurrence risks'. In their classic volume Genetic Counselling, Stevenson and Davison' listed and explained how to derive these risks and kept three pages at the end of the book as an afterthought on the more human and psychological aspects of their work. Nine years later, newer books with the same title2 3 deal almost exclusively with the psychological dimensions involved in the delivery and interpretation of this information.
But whereas diagnostic procedures and the estimation of recurrence are well defined activities and a part of every counsellor's formal training, the psychodynamics of the counselling process is still under study, and consensus has not yet been reached on exactly what counselling techniques should be used to deliver the information and help the counsellees to reach decisions that suit their own lives.
However, there exists overwhelming evidence from both individual practice and published reports, that the interpretation of genetic odds is essentially subjective and depends in the first place on the highly personalised view each person has of a disease. 4 Secondly, it is a common observation that most physicians suffer from 'probability dysgnosia',7 and it appears that more than half the geneticists in two European samples could not properly calculate a probability of recurrence when it differed from 1/4 or 1/2.8 This in itself is evidence that exact rates are not that important, since a substantial proportion of counsellees reach reasonable decisions after having been given the wrong numbers. But There is a difficulty here that constitutes a constant source of worry in some genetic centres. The probability value is meant to convey the idea of doubt or certainty as the counsellees choose; it is not meant to convey on its own the concept of risk or danger. It is extremely important that the counsellor should not confuse uncertainty and doubt with risk and danger: it must be clearly understood that 'doubt' and 'uncertainty', whether in the presence or absence of rates, only mean that we cannot be sure which single event will be chosen out of two or more. The 'risk' and 'danger' only exist when at least one of these possible events is perceived as being bad, and whether a condition is bad or not should be discussed when one talks about the condition itself, not its recurrence. In my experience, when the mathematics are thus deliberately separated from the consequences of the outcome, a careful presentation of exact figures never engenders any problem, especially when the condition and its effects on the family have already been discussed in depth.
One must also appreciate that the decision to be taken by the parents will be based on feelings rather than abstract comprehension. Even Einstein never reconciled himself with the principle of uncertainty in quantum physics because it did not fit with his philosophical approach to nature. Uncertainty is a part of every day life (weather, sports results, death, sex of future children); it is sometimes feared but also widely enjoyed (card games, lotteries, horse races, thrillers) and a large number of people live on their ability to deal with it (stock exchange, business deals, new crops). And although it may appear unreasonable to a visitor from outer space, observation shows G B Cote that gut feelings and experience are given much more importance in these activities than exact mathematics.
It follows from this that the best way to introduce a recurrence rate is to try to minimise the importance of arithmetic in the conversation and to use the simplest mathematical terms, devoid of complexity and biased meanings. For this purpose, as is the case for horse races and stock exchange, odds are far preferable to probabilities and percentages.
That odds are more readily intelligible than other probabilistic statements may not be appreciated by everyone, but any instructor in statistics who is fond of likelihoods will have noticed how the very physicians and biologists who cannot make out elementary probability theory easily understand a problem when it is explained to them in terms of odds. The same is true at the genetic clinic where those counsellees who are intelligent but illiterate and those of borderline intelligence can only be made to understand in those terms. Geneticists are no exception to the rule: they all know the 9:3:3:1 compound ratio in genetics, but how many of them know the equivalent percentages: 56 -25, 18*75, 18.75, and 6.25%?
Odds are easily understood by anyone, they imply the clear formulation of rival hypotheses, and they keep the dichotomy present in mind while conferring the idea of uncertainty.
Obviously, odds cannot be given 'against' or 'in favour of' something without being utterly biased, but they can easily be neutralised if both sides of the dichotomy are given together. For 
